Portland State University

PDXScholar
City Club of Portland

Oregon Sustainable Community Digital Library

10-4-2002

City Club Study on Ballot Measure 21, Ballot
Measure 22, Ballot Measure 26-34, and Ballot
Measure 26-36
City Club of Portland (Portland, Or.)

Follow this and additional works at: https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/oscdl_cityclub
Part of the Urban Studies Commons, and the Urban Studies and Planning Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
City Club of Portland (Portland, Or.), "City Club Study on Ballot Measure 21, Ballot Measure 22, Ballot
Measure 26-34, and Ballot Measure 26-36" (2002). City Club of Portland. 513.
https://pdxscholar.library.pdx.edu/oscdl_cityclub/513

This Report is brought to you for free and open access. It has been accepted for inclusion in City Club of Portland
by an authorized administrator of PDXScholar. Please contact us if we can make this document more accessible:
pdxscholar@pdx.edu.

Published in the
City Club of Portland Bulletin
Vol. 84, No. 18
Friday, October 4,2002

Ballot Measure
Studies
Oregon State Ballot Measure 21: Amends Constitution: Revises
Procedure for Filling Judicial Vacancies, Electing Judges; Allows Vote
for "None of the Above"

Committee Recommends “NO” on Measure 21
Your committee found:
Concerns exist about the role of citizens in the selection and retention
of the judiciary in Oregon. Some contend that judicial elections are
not effective tools of democracy as currently structured. It is
suggested that by allowing voters to vote for "None of the Above,"
judges will become more responsive and aware of the voters.
However, this view is flawed in that it will increase the vulnerability of
judges by exposing them to direct political pressures. Increasing the
role of politics in the judiciary will only weaken the court's ability to
interpret and implement law, especially in controversial cases. We
find Measure 21 to be a problem because it seeks to effect judicial
reform by politicizing the courts.
The other major problem with the measure is its ambiguity. Under
Oregon's constitution, the governor is required to fill all judicial
vacancies by appointment, except when a judge's term of office ends
and he or she does not run for reelection. Under the measure, this
power may or may not be taken away. If not taken away by the
measure, your committee believes that the measure amends the
constitution to allow the legislature to revise or revoke the governor's
authority to appoint judges. These ambiguities alone are sufficient
reason to reject Measure 21.
Your committee unanimously recommends a NO vote on Measure 21.
The City Club membership will vote on this report Friday, October 4, 2002.
Until the membership vote, the City Club of Portland does not have an official
p osi
'tion on this report. The outcome of the vote will be reported in the City
Club Bulletin dated October 18, 2002.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ballot Measure 21 will appear on the ballot as follows:
Caption: AMENDS CONSTITUTION: REVISES PROCEDURE FOR
FILLING JUDICIAL VACANCIES, ELECTING JUDGES; ALLOWS VOTE
FOR "NONE OF THE ABOVE"
Result of "Yes" vote : "Yes" vote revises manner of filling judicial
vacancies; modifies ballots and election procedure in judicial
elections; adds "None of the Above" as official judicial candidate.
Result of "No" vote : " No" vote retains the current manner of filling
judicial vacancies and current election procedure where the judicial
candidate receiving a plurality of votes is elected.
Summary: Amends constitution. Currently the governor fills midterm
judicial vacancies by appointment; appointees serve until the vacancy
is filled at the next general election held more that 61 days after the
vacancy occurs. Measure requires midterm judicial vacancies to be
filled by election at the closest May or November election held more
than 90 days after the vacancy occurs. In all judicial elections,
measure requires election ballot to list candidates and also list "None
of the Above" as an available choice. If "None of the Above" receives
more votes than all other candidates on the ballot, the judicial office
remains unfilled until a candidate other than "None of the Above"
receives a plurality of votes cast at subsequent May and/or November
special elections. Other provisions.
Estimate of Financial Impact : No financial effect on state or local
government expenditures or revenues.
(The language of the caption, question, and summary was prepared
by the Oregon Attorney General.)
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Measure 21 in its entirety reads as follows:
PARAGRAPH 1. Notwithstanding any other provision of this
Constitution, the Constitution of the State of Oregon is amended by
adding a new subsection to Article VII (Amended), Section 1:
Elections to fill the office of judge of the supreme and other
courts shall be conducted in the manner provided by this subsection.
When a judge's position becomes vacant during a term of office, an
election to fill the position will be held at the closest May or
November election, but no sooner than 90 days after the vacancy.
In all elections for the position of judge, "None of the Above"
shall be listed on the ballot as an official candidate in addition to all
other candidates. The candidate who receives the most votes in the
election shall be elected to the position.
When more votes are cast for the "None of the Above"
candidate than for any other, special elections will be held in May and
November, until the position is filled with a candidate other than
" None of the Above."
Additional provisions, consistent with this subsection,
governing the appointment and election of judges of the supreme and
other courts, may be created by law.
PARAGRAPH 2. If any portion, clause or phrase of this Amendment is
for any reason held to be invalid or unconstitutional by a court of
competent jurisdiction, the remaining portions, clauses, and phrases
shall not be affected but shall remain in full force and effect.
Measure 21 proposes to significantly change the way Oregon holds
judicial elections. City Club created your committee to review Measure
21 and to recommend a position on the measure to City Club's general
membership. City Club screened committee members for conflicts of
interest to ensure that no member had an economic interest in the
outcome of the study or was publicly identified with an existing position on the study topic.
Committee members met in August and early September. The
committee members interviewed Measure 21 proponents and
opponents. The committee simultaneously held interviews for
Measure 22, and heard from witnesses interviewed in that study who
had comments on Measure 21.
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What would Measure 21 do?
Measure 21 is a citizen initiative that would amend Oregon
Constitution provisions on judicial elections. Measure 21 would
change the way judicial vacancies are filled. The measure would
change the judicial election process in two distinct, but related
aspects: how all judicial elections are decided; and the timing of
elections that fill midterm vacancies. The measure may or may not
revoke the governor's power to appoint judges. The measure may
grant the legislature the authority to revise the appointment process.

How will judicial elections be decided?
The measure adds the option of voting for "None of the Above" as an
official candidate in all judicial elections in Oregon. Should "None of
the Above" receive more votes than any other candidate, another
election would be held in the next May or November election. This
process continues until a candidate receives more votes than "None of
the Above" and fills the office.

How will midterm vacancies be filled?
Presently, a midterm judicial vacancy is filled by appointment by the
governor with appointees serving until the next general election held
more than 61 days after the vacancy occurs and thereafter if elected.
The measure changes the scheduling of the election to the closest May
or November election more than 90 days after the vacancy occurs.
The text of the measure is ambiguous as to whether appointments to
fill midterm vacancies could or could not be made by the governor.

II. BACKGROUND
Judges are chosen in two ways. At times, a retiring judge stays in office
until the end of his or her term, leaving the choice of his or her
replacement to the voters. More commonly, however, judges leave
office before the end of their term. In these instances, replacement
judges are appointed by the governor. Oregon's judicial elections
provide the citizens of the state with an opportunity to remove judges
and replace them with other candidates. Often these elections occur
with an incumbent who came to office by appointment from the
governor.
Many judicial races have only one candidate. Proponents of the
measure cite this, and the unique incumbent status granted to the
governor's appointees, as impediments to free electoral selection of
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judges. Proponents have referred to the current judicial election
process as "rubberstamping" the governor's choices. They believe
the current process is weighted in favor of these incumbents, and this
puts challengers at a disadvantage in elections. Further, proponents
claim the current electoral system leads to voters feeling that they are
only able to affirm the governor's choice. Measure 21 places before
the voters the option to select none of the candidates listed, and to
instead vote again at a later date, presumably but not necessarily, with
new candidates.

The National Movement for "None of the Above"
This option of using "None of the Above" is one that groups across the
United States have been pursuing through legislatures and citizen
initiative processes. The movement to add "None of the Above" is
seen as a way to encourage voter turnout, maintain fair elections, and
guarantee choice for the voters.
Proponents of "None of the Above" claim that voters have been
increasingly forced to choose either between the lesser of two evils or
to abstain from voting. They argue that with the introduction of
" None of the Above" voters are granted a veto with which to reject
candidates and demand a new candidate or candidates.
The backers of this new election tool also claim that "None of the
Above" would compel candidates to be more responsive to voters.
Supporters claim that in instances where "negative" campaigning
comes into play and candidates engage in attacks on each other, the
voters could toss out all of the candidates. In doing so, supporters say,
candidates would be made more aware of the voters' desires.
Finally, the supporters of "None of the Above" take issue with
uncontested races. They claim that in some states and races, the
number of uncontested candidates is rising too fast. So, in order to
give the voters control over their representation, "None of the Above"
allows the people to remove uncontested candidates, or at least with
this threat, cause uncontested candidates to become more responsive
to voters. In the 2002 Oregon judicial elections, approximately
one-half of the races were uncontested.
At present, only one state uses "None of the Above" in its elections. In
1975 the State of Nevada implemented a non-binding "None of the
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Above" option. This version of "None of the Above" allows voters to
register their displeasure with the choice of candidates, but the votes
do not count toward the actual selection of a candidate. In other
words, when "None of the Above" receives the most votes, the
candidate who receives the second most takes office. This has
occurred in Nevada four times in the last twenty-five years.

Relevant City Club Positions
Measure 21 is a proposed amendment to the Oregon Constitution and
thus the committee considered City Club's February 1996 report,
Initiative and Referendum in Oregon . The measure at hand does
"relate only to the ... rights of the people," which the 1996 report
prefers of initiative-based amendments. The measure was offered to
the legislature, but it did not receive a hearing.

III. ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON
A. Arguments Advanced in Favor of Measure 21
Measure 21 proponents offered the following arguments:
Judicial elections lack true voter input as the choices are constrained
by the governor. "None of the Above" would increase voter input,
voter turnout, and judicial accountability by creating an effective
method for voter involvement.
Measure 21 will brings judges into the public. The current system
reinforces an insular judiciary that is not responsive to the people.
Measure 21 will make all judges responsive to the public as they may
be voted out of office due to "None of the Above."
Measure 21 increases the separation of powers in government by
changing the current governor-dominated system and returning the
selection and retention of judges to the people by creating a viable
alternative to the candidates.
Increased voter input will result in court decisions and actions that
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better reflect the values and mores of Oregon and its communities.
Selection of judges is presently too dominated by lawyers and special
interests from the Willamette Valley.

B. Arguments Advanced Against Measure 21
Measure 21 opponents offered the following arguments:
Elections are meant to fill offices, not to empty them. "None of the
Above" is destructive to the democratic process.
Oregon currently has a good system of having the governor appoint
judges and having these choices validated or rejected by the people.
There is no problem for Measure 21 to fix.
If Oregon truly lacks good candidates running for judgeships, "None of
the Above" will not encourage more candidates to run. Better salaries
or other methods of reform would be more successful.
By allowing the voters to remove judges, the role of politics in courts
will increase. This will violate the core strength of the courts, that of a
neutral and fair judiciary. In Oregon, judges have not been politicians.
This measure could change that.
Increasing the political influence on the courts will be followed by an
increase in campaign spending by candidates.
Language in the measure is ambiguous in its relation to the role of the
governor to appoint judges when a seat opens up in the middle of a
term.
Measure 21 would make judges vulnerable to negative campaigns
made by special interest groups who want to "get" a particular judge
for a certain issue or set of issues.

City Club Study on

Ballot Measure 21

IV. DISCUSSION
As your committee conducted its research, two main issues came up
time and time again. First is the role of elections in the judiciary.
What is the appropriate role of elections in the judiciary and is it in
need of improvement? Is this truly the best way to conduct elections?
The second issue is the ambiguous language of the measure as it may
relate to the governor's duty to initially fill judicial vacancies by
appointment.

The Role of Judiciary Elections in a Democracy
The committee recognized that we must first evaluate how elections
work in the current system. Judicial elections are markedly different
from other elections in Oregon. Judicial candidates are banned from
taking public positions or endorsing platforms by the rules of judicial
conduct. Candidates are also prohibited from directly soliciting
campaign contributions. These special circumstances reveal a basic
ethic that underlies all judicial elections, an ethic that judges are
expected to rule on points of law and fact, not on ideology. Judges are
expected to interpret and implement the laws passed by a
representative body, or to determine a law's constitutionality, and not
to stray into their own personal beliefs.
The proponents of this measure cite a growing dissatisfaction with
judges, in particular those identified as "activist judges." These
"activist judges" are accused of abusing their discretion to interpret
laws in order to make public policy. The proponents thus state that
since we cannot expect judges to be truly neutral, we must make them
accountable to the voters. The theory at hand is that judges cannot be
unbiased, so we must remove the façade of neutrality and return the
courts to the people.
In opposition to this viewpoint, a number of witnesses expressed their
fears that opening up judicial elections would compromise the court.
Witnesses who had a background with the courts expressed their
personal conviction that judges in Oregon take their oath seriously
and leave politics at home when they rule on cases. While they
acknowledge occasional problems in the courts, bad decisions are
made only rarely. Ours is not a perfect system, but it also is not a
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broken one. To move towards a more politicized court would only
make matters worse. Opponents also noted that the people are not
without options. The Oregon Constitution (Article II, Section 18) as
supplemented by Oregon Revised Statutes, Chapter 249, permits
voters to recall judges. This is in addition to the Supreme Court's
constitutional authority to remove or otherwise sanction judges, as
provided for in Article VII, Section 8. Since 1965, two judges have been
removed, four suspended, four censured, three reprimanded, and one
otherwise disciplined. (See research material item four in Appendix B.)
An additional problem arises due to a requirement that an appointed
candidate who is filling a judicial vacancy must run in both the
primary and the general elections, regardless of the outcome of the
primary. In an interview with the compliance specialist of the Division
of Elections we were told that judicial positions filled by appointment
are considered vacant until a general election retains or replaces the
appointee. In other words, Measure 21 would require every appointed
candidate to run against "None of the Above" twice in six months,
including candidates who receive an absolute majority of the votes in
the primary. A likely scenario would have an appointed judge running
against an ideological opponent in the primary, along with "None of
the Above," winning that election perhaps by an absolute majority
and then running against "None of the Above" in the general election.
This would give the opponents of an appointed judge two quite
different lines of attack.

The Language of the Ballot Measure
Article V, Section 16, of the Oregon Constitution provides: "...when at
any time a vacancy occurs...in the office of judge of any court, the
governor shall fill such vacancy by appointment, which shall expire
when a successor has been elected and qualified."
As has been alluded to in this report, there is some question whether
this measure will revoke the governor's constitutional duty to appoint
judges when midterm vacancies occur. The language of the measure
does not explicitly state that it is superceding the section in the
Constitution quoted above. However, the first and third
subparagraphs of the measure are confusing:
"Elections to fill the office of judge of the supreme and other
courts shall be conducted in the manner provided by this
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subsection. When a judge's position becomes vacant during a
term of office, an election to fill the position will be held at the
closest May or November election, but no sooner than 90 days
after the vacancy."
"When more votes are cast for the "None of the Above"
candidate than for any other, special elections will be held in
May and November, until the position is filled with a
candidate other than "None of the Above."
Most of the Committee initially interpreted these paragraphs to
remove the authority of the governor to appoint. This was furthered
by the summary of the measure provided by the Oregon Attorney
General's Office and the Secretary of State's office. The summary
states:
"Currently, the governor fills midterm judicial vacancies by
appointment; appointees serve until the vacancy is filled at
the next general election held more than 61 days after the
vacancy occurs. Measure requires midterm judicial vacancies
be filled by election at the closest May or November election
held more than 90 days after the vacancy occurs. ...
If "None of the Above" receives more votes than all other
candidates on the ballot, the judicial office remains unfilled
until a candidate other than "None of the Above" receives a
plurality of votes cast at subsequent ...elections."
The ambiguity is whether the language is meant to direct the only way
in which midterm and "None of the Above" vacancies are filled, or
whether it is simply stating when elections will be held, presumably
after an appointment has been made by the governor.
When asked about this, chief petitioner Don McIntire stated that
nowhere in the language of the ballot measure does the revocation of
the governor's power to appoint come up. When asked about the
attorney general's summary, Mr. McIntire said that he disagreed with
the summary that was drafted, particularly the sentence which reads:
"If "None of the Above" receives more votes than all other candidates
on the ballot, the judicial office remains unfilled until a candidate
other than "None of the Above" receives a plurality of votes cast at
subsequent May and/or November special elections." However, Mr.
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McIntire did not challenge the summary in court as permitted if there
is disagreement. When asked why no one challenged the response, Mr.
McIntire claimed that the process is too time consuming and involved.
According to Mr. McIntire, if a challenge had been filed the attorney
general's office and the Supreme Court could have stalled the
measure's certification until it was too late to obtain the necessary
number of signatures on the petition. In a telephone interview, the
assistant attorney general assigned to ballot measures told your
committee that the process of petitioning the Supreme Court to
challenge the ballot title and summary, a decision by the court, and (if
ordered) a revision of the ballot title or summary would not take longer
than four months. This would have left seven and a half months to
gather signatures, which should have been sufficient.
The final piece of ambiguity is the final subparagraph in PARAGRAPH 1
of the measure. The subparagraph states:
"Additional provisions, consistent with this subsection,
governing the appointment and election of judges of the
supreme and other courts, may be created by law." (Emphasis
added.)
Committee members repeatedly asked Mr. McIntire if this language
was intended to amend the constitution to allow the legislature to deal
with judicial appointments by statute. Mr. McIntire did not have an
answer to this question.
The committee believes that if subparagraphs one and three, quoted
above, do change the governor's authority, then they supercede the
authority granted to the governor in the Oregon Constitution. If
subparagraphs one and three do not do this, then the committee
believes that the final subparagraph will authorize the legislature to
make changes to the governor's power to appoint.

V. CONCLUSIONS
If we find that Oregon's judicial election process is in need of reform
we must be careful of the reforms we implement. Oregon can choose
from many electoral systems when attempting to change judicial
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elections. In regard to Measure 21, the committee questions the logic
of testing a unique voting method on a branch of government that is
not meant to be representative. Introducing this novel notion of
voting in other races that are defined by more traditional politics
appears to be wiser. Some other states use a system of elections where
voters choose whether or not to retain a judge, but these states use the
governor's power to appoint to find the qualified replacement. It is
not clear to the committee why a "None of the Above" structure is
better than this system of retention voting. As one opponent
commented, it just seems to be a negative vote for the judiciary, not a
constructive vote for society. One scenario the committee can see
occurring with this measure is a constant revolving door on certain
judicial races where judges are removed every six months. The results
of this would clearly not be in the best interest of a community, where
the constant change could cause different applications of the law
every six months and increased administrative costs. Of course, this
scenario is dependent on the governor still being able to appoint the
replacement for the position left empty by "None of the Above."
The committee fails to see a real problem that would be remedied with
the passage of this measure. While certain court cases and decisions
have recently attracted public criticism, there does not appear to be a
systemic problem that requires the changes proposed in this measure.
The members of this committee are convinced that the passage of this
measure would produce a new dynamic in the court that would
require judges to cultivate and maintain a public image in order to
stay in office. This would compromise the neutrality and fairness of
the court. It would allow political influence and campaign finance to
enter the courtroom and would worsen the problem the proponents
believe exists today. If judges are overly influenced by special interests
in the present system, then opening the floodgates on campaign
contributions, political influence, and lobbying would only make
matters worse.
The other major problem with the measure is that the language is far
from clear regarding the governor's duty to fill judicial vacancies by
appointment. Ironically, the resolution of this question would be
made by our Supreme Court or possibly the Court of Appeals.
Whatever its decision, it is doubtful that the court's decision would
reflect the understanding or intent of the voters. Either the governor
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would lose the power of appointment, or the legislature would be
given the authority to revise or eliminate this power. Because the
measure would amend the Constitution in two respects; i.e., revising
the procedure for filling judicial vacancies by election and revoking or
revising the governor's unfettered duty to fill vacancies by
appointment, the measure's passage would appear to be vulnerable to
revocation as embracing more than one subject. However,
PARAGRAPH 2 of the measure provides that if any portion of the
measure is held to be invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining
portions shall remain in full force and effect. Would the court throw
out the election portion or the appointment portion or declare the
entire measure inoperative? We don't know.
If the authority of the governor to appoint judges is revoked, then the
current process of selecting judges will no longer be used. Presently
the Oregon State Bar Association offers a pool of candidates to the
governor from which to choose. The process of generating this pool
involves input from the entire bar for candidates for the Tax Court,
Court of Appeals, and Supreme Court, from members of the bar from
the districts to which candidates for trial courts will be appointed, and
from a small group of lay people. While the governor is not bound by
the choices in the pool, this process helps the governor select skilled
and respected candidates. The committee fears this important
selection process would no longer play a role in judicial elections if all
judicial positions were filled only by election.

VI. RECOMMENDATION
Your Committee unanimously recommends a NO vote on Measure 21.
Respectfully submitted,
Kenneth Dueker
Jack Featheringill
David Mandell
Paul Manson
Steve Olson
Bob Shoemaker, chair
Chuck Stuckey, research advisor
Wade Fickler, research director
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VII. APPENDICES
A.Witness List
Jas Adams, assistant attorney general, responsible for ballot measures
Margie Franz, compliance specialist, Division of Elections, Office of the
Secretary of State
Angel Lopez, president, Oregon State Bar Association
Don McIntire, chief petitioner
Edwin Peterson, retired chief justice, Oregon Supreme Court
Jacob Tanzer, retired justice, Oregon Supreme Court and Court of Appeals

B.Research material
1. Certified ballot title, initiative petition #67 (Measure 21), Office of the
Secretary of State, 7/18/02.
2. Wording of Measure 2 1, Office of the Secretary of State, 7/ 15 / 02.
3. Detailed information on initiative petition #67 (Measure 21) from website
of the Secretary of State, 8/12/02. www.sos.state.or.us
4. Letter to the committee chair from Commission on Judicial Fitness and
Disability, received 8/22/02.
5. Two articles on None of the Above, NOTA advocacy organization, 8/15/02.
http://www.nota.org/washjm nota.html
6. Proposed resolution of Oregon State Bar Association in opposition to
Initiative 67 (Measure 21), received 8/19/02.
7. Voters' pamphlet information from Taxpayer Association of Oregon,
proponents of Measure 21, received 8/28/02.
8. Oregon Constitution.
9. Portland General Electric Company v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317
OR 606 (1993). Leading Oregon Supreme Court case on statutory
construction.
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Studies
Oregon State Ballot Measure 22: Amends Constitution: Requires
Oregon Supreme Court Judges and Court of Appeals Judges to be
Elected by District

Committee Recommends “NO” on Measure 22
Your committee found:
Measure 22 seeks to increase the accountability of Oregon's Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals by guaranteeing that these courts reflect
the geographic diversity of the state with judges selected from
districts. While a disproportionate number of Oregon Supreme Court
and Court of Appeals justices reside in the northern Willamette Valley
and disproportionately few in the eastern, southern, and coastal parts
of the state, there is insufficient evidence that this geographical
imbalance has seriously hurt the courts' performance and
jeopardized their ability to render impartial and objective decisions.
Having courts that better reflect the regional diversity of Oregon is a
laudable goal. But without stronger evidence that either of the
current courts is seriously flawed, we cannot recommend such a major
overhaul of Oregon's judicial system, especially one that has such
potential for politicizing the courts. Electing judges by district will
make it easier for small groups of citizens to unseat judges who have
voted for or written unpopular decisions. Furthermore,
selecting judges by districts may lead to the impression that these
justices serve as representatives of specific constituencies in whose
interest they are obligated to act, rather than on behalf of the entire
state, its constitution and laws. Finally, the goal of increasing the
courts’ regional diversity could be achieved by other less intrusive and
more informal means that do not require constitutional or statutory
change, and that do not formally tie judges to specific constituencies.
Your committee unanimously recommends a NO vote on Measure 22.
The City Club membership will vote on this report Friday, October 4, 2002.
Until the membership vote, the City Club of Portland does not have an official
osition on this report. The outcome of the vote will be reported in the City
lub Bulletin dated October 18, 2002.

C
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I. INTRODUCTION
Ballot Measure 22 will appear on the ballot as follows:
Caption: AMENDS CONSTITUTION: REQUIRES OREGON SUPREME
COURT JUDGES AND COURT OF APPEALS JUDGES TO BE ELECTED
BY DISTRICT.
Result of "Yes" Vote: "Yes" vote creates judicial districts based on
population and requires Oregon Supreme Court judges and Court of
Appeals judges to be elected from these districts.
Result of "No" Vote: "No" vote retains the current system for electing
Oregon Supreme Court judges and Court of Appeal judges by
statewide vote with no district residency requirements.
Summary: Amends constitution. Currently, all Oregon Supreme
Court judges and Court of Appeals judges are elected by statewide
vote. Judges must live within state but have no other residency
requirements. Measure divides state into seven districts based on
population, for purpose of electing Supreme Court judges; electors
within each district elect only one Supreme Court judge. Measure
divides state into five districts for election of judges of other appellate
courts created by law (except Tax Court), with two judges elected from
each district. Requires Supreme Court and Court of Appeals judges
elected or appointed to office to reside within their districts. Requires
reapportionment of judicial districts when legislative districts are
reapportioned. Revises procedure and requirements for appointments to judicial vacancies and recall of judges. Other provisions.
Estimate of Financial Impact: No financial effect on state
government expenditures or revenues. Indeterminate financial effect
on local government expenditures. No financial effect on local
government revenues.
(The language of the caption, question and summary was prepared by
the Oregon Attorney General.)
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Measure 22 proposes significant changes in the way that Oregon
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals judges are selected. City Club
created our committee to review Measure 22 and recommend a
position on the measure to the City Club membership. City Club
screened members of the committee for conflict of interest to ensure
that no member had an economic interest in the outcome of the study
or was publicly identified with an existing position on the study topic.
Committee members met during August and early September. The
committee interviewed Measure 22 proponents and opponents,
retired members of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, the
president of the Oregon State Bar Association, and the district
attorney of Clatsop County. The committee simultaneously held
interviews for Measure 21, and heard from witnesses interviewed for
that study who had comments on Measure 22. Committee members
also reviewed relevant articles, reports and other material on judicial
selection in other states.

II. BACKGROUND
In Oregon as in other states and at the federal level the role of the
courts has become an issue of conflict. According to proponents of
Measure 22, the courts have become too politicized, too prone to
judicial activism and too out of touch with the common sense of the
people of Oregon. According to these critics, the courts act as if their
constituency is a group of elite lawyers living in the northern
Willamette Valley, rather than the citizens of Oregon.
The controversy over the courts in Oregon has been intensified by
their role in overturning criminal convictions on procedural grounds
and their role in the initiative process, especially after the Supreme
Court's decision in Armatta v. Kitzhaber (1998). That decision
overruled Measure 40, the "Crime Victim's Bill of Rights," which had
passed in 1996. The court ruled that if an initiative introduces more
than one change to the constitution, all of the changes must be closely
related to each other. This decision was based on the court's
interpretation of Article XVII, Section 1 of the Oregon Constitution.
Since the Armatta decision, the Oregon Supreme Court has struck
down a number of constitutional initiatives that had been approved
by the voters but were ruled to have introduced more than one
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change. Measure 3, a constitutional amendment that introduced term
limits and was passed by Oregon voters ten years ago, was recently
struck down on these grounds. The Oregon Supreme Court is also
currently reviewing Measure 7 (2000), a measure that requires
landowners to be compensated for the cost of regulatory changes. For
critics of the Oregon Supreme Court, these decisions not only
exemplify judicial activism, but also demonstrate that the Court has
become an impediment to democracy. These decisions, it is argued,
demonstrate that political preferences, not the law, currently guide the
Supreme Court.
The make-up of the current Supreme Court and Court of Appeals has
led to the perception that these courts do not reflect the citizenry of
Oregon. At present, only one judge on either the Supreme Court or
the Court of Appeals lives outside of the Willamette Valley. Of the
seven members of the Oregon Supreme Court, three are from Portland
and four are from Salem. The membership of the Oregon Court of
Appeals is similarly skewed toward the Valley, with six justices from
Portland, one from Salem, two from Eugene and one from The Dalles.
Furthermore, recent governors have broken an informal tradition of
ensuring through appointment the presence of eastern Oregonians on
these courts.
The regional imbalance on the appellate courts also reflects an
imbalance in the applicant pool. Far more individuals from the
northern Willamette Valley than from the rest of the state apply for
these judgeships. Of the twenty applicants for the Court of Appeals in
December 2000, four-fifths were from the northern Willamette Valley.
The other applicants were from Ashland, Hood River and Klamath
Falls, and another applicant was from Charlotte, Virginia. In August
2000, the Oregon State Bar Association received eight applications for
the Supreme Court. All of the applicants resided in the Portland-Salem
1
area.
If Oregon adopts Measure 22, Oregon will not be alone in selecting
judges by districts. Approximately one-third of the states elects their
appellate judges from districts and nine states elect their Supreme
Court justices by district. Oregon also had a districting system in the
past. The Oregon Constitution of 1859 called for Supreme Court
justices to be elected from districts. A 1910 amendment to the
constitution granted the legislature the power to change the judicial
1 Numbers provided by Kateri Walsh, Oregon State Bar Community Relations
Administrator.
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system by statute, which the legislature subsequently did, eliminating
judicial districts for the Supreme Court (the only state appellate court
at that time).
Measure 22 would create five districts for the Court of Appeals and
seven districts for the Supreme Court. While the districts would be
divided evenly by population, the exact shape of the districts would be
determined by the legislature. Both proponents and opponents of
Measure 22 assume that the districts for the Court of Appeals would
match the five congressional districts. The legislature would have to
create new districts for the Supreme Court.

III. ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON
A. Arguments Advanced in Favor of Measure 22
Measure 22 would create a Supreme Court and Court of Appeals that
are more accountable to, and more representative of, the people of
Oregon.
Measure 22 would create a Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
whose memberships better reflect the ideological and regional
diversity of Oregon. Courts that better reflect Oregon and are more
accountable to its people would not be out of touch with common
sense.
Measure 22 would make it more difficult for the courts to make
political decisions while claiming that they are impartial. It would be
difficult for the courts to hide their political bias.
Measure 22 would make the constituency of judges the people of
Oregon, rather than a group of elite lawyers from the northern
Willamette Valley.
Measure 22 would increase the legitimacy of the courts by ensuring
that citizens from outside the northern Willamette Valley have their
voices heard.
Measure 22, by reducing the area in which judges campaign, would
reduce the cost of judicial elections and de-politicize the judiciary.
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Measure 22 would make it easier for citizens to make informed
choices when voting for judges. Voters would have fewer candidates
to choose among. Since candidates would be residents of the voters'
districts, the voters would also be more likely to know something
about the candidates.
Measure 22 would help the court draw on the untapped talent pool of
capable lawyers who reside outside of the northern Willamette Valley.
Measure 22 would not weaken the Oregon Constitution by adding
another new and needless amendment. Measure 22 would restore the
original Oregon Constitution of 1859.
Measure 22 would not reduce the collegiality of the courts. Federal
circuit courts that cover a much wider geographic area than the
proposed Oregon districts are able to maintain their collegiality.
Moreover, new communication technology, such as teleconferencing,
reduces the need for face-to-face contact.

B. Arguments Advanced Against Measure 22
Measure 22 is a solution in search of a problem. The Oregon Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals are impartial bodies that effectively carry
out their missions. The courts have not reached a single decision that
has been affected by a geographic bias.
Measure 22 would make Supreme Court and Court of Appeals justices
the representatives of particular constituencies, rather than
responsible to the entire state. Judges are not representatives and
should not have constituencies.
Measure 22, by turning judges into representatives, would politicize
the courts. Unlike legislatures, courts do not reach decisions by
bargaining and compromise, and therefore justices do not and should
not act as the representatives of specific interests or areas.
Measure 22 would lead to political witch-hunts. It would make it
easier for a small group of mobilized and well-financed voters to
unseat a judge because the judge had made a politically unpopular
decision.
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Measure 22 would prevent the governor from appointing and the
citizens from electing the most capable judges; the governor and the
voters would be forced to choose someone from a particular district
possibly overlooking the most qualified candidate.
The number of Supreme Court and Court of Appeals judges from the
northern Willamette Valley reflects Oregon's demography. A
disproportionate number of lawyers live in this region. The specialty
law firms located in the Portland and Salem area act as magnets
attracting talented and ambitious lawyers from around the state.
These law firms provide lawyers the experience they need for the
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.
Measure 22 would undermine the collegiality of the Supreme Court
and Court of Appeals. Because there would be more judges on these
courts who, to avoid a long commute, would have to do most of their
work away from Salem, judges would have difficulty building the
camaraderie they need to do their job effectively.

IV. DISCUSSION
Are the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
Serving Oregon Well?
Is the current selection process for the Oregon Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals in need of reform? Does the process select the most
fit judges, or does it exclude potential candidates who are not insiders
or who reside in the wrong part of the state? Do the Supreme Court
and Court of Appeals act as if their constituency is the small group of
elite lawyers who inhabit the northern Willamette Valley, or have they
served well the citizens of Oregon in their entirety?
These are difficult questions to answer as courts are notoriously hard
institutions to evaluate objectively. Those who disagree with the
substance of a decision are more likely to argue that the courts are
making political assessments rather than judgments of law. Similarly,
groups that are satisfied with a ruling are also more predisposed to
view favorably the process by which that outcome was reached. The
very fact that a case reaches these courts means that it is difficult and
contentious. Any decision that the court reaches on such a case will
undoubtedly be strongly criticized by one group or another. The fact
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that there are aggrieved individuals who are angered by recent court
decisions is insufficient evidence that the judiciary is failing to do its
job or that it is has acted without impartiality. Nor is strong partisan
approval evidence in the courts' favor.
For the most part, the committee found that those individuals
interviewed who had spent time on the courts had the most positive
view of them. The retired Supreme Court and Court of Appeals
justices whom the committee interviewed expressed extremely
evaluations of the integrity, competence and impartiality of the fellow
justices with whom they served. Both of these retired justices
emphatically denied that regional bias crept into any decision that
they witnessed. Both were deeply impressed by the intelligence and
hard work of their colleagues on the bench.
These positive evaluations by judicial insiders may simply reflect the
extent to which a biased and insular group controls the Supreme Court
and Court of Appeals. However, the committee found no evidence to
support such a bleak conclusion. These positive assessments of the
courts ought to be taken sincerely. Finally, the proponents of Measure
22 failed to offer any concrete evidence that dissatisfaction with the
courts is either particularly deep or widespread nor did they offer any
non-anecdotal evidence that regional distrust of the courts is growing.
Furthermore, they could not point to a specific decision that
demonstrated a regional bias.
However, if the perception exists that the judiciary is ruled by insular
insiders it may suggest another kind of problem: the failure of the
courts and the Oregon State Bar Association to adequately educate the
public about how judges are selected and how they make decisions.
The problem may not be bias, but instead a lack of public awareness
as to what the courts do and the constraints to which they are bound.
If this pattern of elite approval and popular distrust toward the courts
in Oregon does exist it would mirror a pattern found over the last
thirty years across America's political and social institutions.
Explanations for this widespread gap between elite and popular
perceptions of public institutions are complex. However, the existence
of such a gap does not necessarily indicate that these institutions are
2
performing poorly.

2

John Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. Congress as Public Enemy, (Cambridge
University Press, 1995; Joseph Nye et al., (eds.), Why People Don't Trust Government ,
(Harvard University Press, 1997).
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The Causes, Consequences and Remedies for the
Courts’ Regional Imbalance
While the courts’ performance is difficult to assess objectively, the
imbalance in the courts' membership is easily discerned. At present,
all of the members of the Oregon Supreme Court are from either
Portland or Salem, and only one of the members of the Court of
Appeals lives outside of the Willamette Valley. These facts raise three
questions: Has this geographic imbalance affected the performance of
the court? What is the cause of this regional disparity? Would Measure
22 turn the court into a more diverse body?
As noted earlier, biases of the courts are difficult to measure. However,
neither of the retired justices with whom we spoke could think of a
single instance in which regional differences were of significance for
questions before the courts. It may still be argued that even if the
courts have not demonstrated a real regional bias in their decisions,
greater regional representation would still improve their performance.
Increasing the regional diversity of the courts might still increase the
range of perspectives discussed, help unearth unarticulated biases,
and enrich the courts' deliberations. Even if the performance of the
current courts has been good, the performance of more regionally
balanced courts might be even better.
What has led to this regional imbalance? The severity of the current
imbalance, at least for the Oregon Supreme Court, is readily explained:
Since the late eighties, no governor has appointed an eastern
Oregonian. It is beyond the scope of this study to explain why this
tradition has ended. However, if this regional disparity continues, and
this issue becomes politically salient, it is likely that a future governor
will respond and make sure that eastern, southern and coastal
Oregonians are on the appellate courts.
The geographical imbalance on the courts also reflects a skewed
judicial applicant pool. Extremely few individuals from other parts of
the state are choosing to apply for these positions. Three explanations
for this regional imbalance have been offered.
According to the first explanation offered by proponents of Measure
22 outsiders do not apply because they know they will not get the
jobs. The absence of their applications reflects their belief that

City Club Study on

Ballot Measure 22

the process is biased against them. If this explanation were valid there
should be at least a few complaints from aggrieved applicants. No
proponent of the measure provided evidence of such complaints.
The second explanation, also offered by opponents of Measure 22, is
that while there are very talented lawyers practicing in all parts of the
state, the specialty law firms that attract the lawyers who are most
likely to seek positions on the Supreme Court or Court of Appeals are
located in the Portland and Salem areas. The lawyers who practice
with this type of firm are also more likely to have experience arguing
cases before the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, experience that
is often seen as especially valuable for positions on Oregon’s appellate
courts. While this is a reasonable explanation for some of the regional
imbalance in the applicant pool, it does not explain its extent.
Proponents of Measure 22 argued that the popularity of this claim is
evidence of elitist snobbery against eastern Oregonians.
The third explanation was also offered by opponents of Measure 22:
Individuals from outside the northern Willamette Valley do not apply
for these positions because they don't want the onerous commute that
serving in Salem while living far away would require. This is a
plausible explanation. However, even if this explains the imbalance in
the applicant pool, it does not fully explain the imbalance on the
court. We can imagine reasons why the governor or the voters would
go out of their way to choose worthy candidates who are from other
parts of the state.
Would Measure 22 improve the regional diversity of the courts? It
would certainly ensure that some justices formally reside in other
parts of the state. But this may only mean that they maintain legal
residency in that area; it would not guarantee that they would bring a
regional viewpoint to the courts.
Also, if one goal of Measure 22 is to create a judiciary that engages in
richer and more open deliberations, Measure 22 may not be the
answer. Electing judges from districts rather than at-large reduces the
likelihood that a judge will dissent against a majority vote to uphold
3
the death penalty. In other words, Measure 22 may actually reduce the
diversity of opinion expressed by the courts.

3

Melinda Gann Hall, "Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts,"

TheJournal of Politics , Vol. 54, No. 2 (May 1992), 427-446.
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Justices as Representatives: Does Measure 22
Politicize the Judiciary?
The sponsors of Measure 22 argue that districting will make judges
more accountable and more representative. Judicial accountability is
undoubtedly an important goal. Mechanisms for removing
incompetent and irresponsible judges already exist. The Oregon
Constitution (Article II, Section 18), as supplemented by Oregon
Revised Statutes Chapter 249, permits voters to recall judges. This law
is in addition to the Supreme Court's constitutional authority to
remove or otherwise sanction judges, as provided for in Article VII,
Section 8. Since 1965, two judges have been removed, four suspended,
four censured, three reprimanded, and one otherwise disciplined. 4
There are reasons to believe, however, that electing judges from
districts rather than at-large would improve accountability. At-large
elections require voters to evaluate a large number of judicial
elections. Districting reduces the number of judicial positions each
voter has to evaluate so that the voter can focus on candidates running
in his or her district. This reduction would increase the probability
that voters are informed about the candidates.
Judicial accountability must be balanced against the all too real
dangers of political witch-hunts. Removing a judge who has violated a
code of ethics or acted incompetently is one thing. Removing a judge
who has made an unpopular decision based on the law is another.
Large districts, such as those created by an at-large electoral system,
enable incompetent judges to be removed while reducing the
likelihood that a judge will be kicked out for purely political reasons.
Smaller districts make it easier for disgruntled and mobilized groups
to vote out a judge who has made a decision with which they disagree.
While smaller districts might reduce the escalating cost of judicial
campaigns, they would also make it easier for outsiders to pump
money into local elections, and influence their outcome.
Whether judges ought to be representatives is a different question.
Judges are not supposed to act on behalf of particular groups or
constituencies; they are supposed to serve the entire community by
deciding matters of law. Nor are they well equipped to act as
representatives. Proponents of Measure 22 who criticize Oregon's
judges for "making law from the bench" acknowledge this distinction:
They are criticizing judges for acting as legislators.
4
Letter to committee chair from Oregon Commission on Judicial Fitness and Disability,
August 22, 2002.
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Research demonstrates that judges respond to electoral pressure.
Judges who face competitive elections are more likely to make
decisions that are popular with their constituencies but go against
previously expressed views than are judges who do not face
6
competitive elections. According to one study, judges who were
confronted by electoral pressures were less likely to
dissent when a majority of their colleagues voted to uphold a death
7
penalty. Another study that looked at the effects of electing judges
from districts found that judges who are elected from districts are
even less likely to dissent in death penalty cases than are judges
elected at-large. 8
If the problem is judicial activism judges acting like legislators
Measure 22 cannot be the solution. Giving judges a political mandate
by making them the representatives of a particular district would
invite political decision-making rather than reduce its likelihood.
Having judges serve as representatives of districts may yield a court
whose decisions are more popular. However, to argue in favor of
Measure 22 on these grounds is to argue in favor of politicizing the
courts.
If judges have high ethical standards, why should electing them from
a particular district damage either their integrity or their impartiality?
One would hope and assume that districting would not dramatically
change the ethical standards of Oregon's judges. The relevant
question is whether districting would create institutional pressures on
judges that go against their better sense and higher calling. As
discussed above, it seems likely that it would. Moreover, districting is
likely to create the public perception that judges do and should act as
the representatives of particular constituencies. This public
perception can only increase the electoral pressure to do so.

5

Philip L. Dubois, From Ballot to Bench , (University of Texas Press, 1980).
Paul R. Brace and Melinda Hall, "The Interplay of Preferences, Cases Facts, Context, and
Race in the Politics of Judicial Choice," The Journal of Politics , Vol. 59, No. 4 (November
1997), 1206-1231.
7Hall, 1992.
8
Melinda Gann Hall, "Justices as Representatives: Elections and Judicial Politics in the
American States," American Politics Quarterly , Vol. 23, No. 4 (Oct., 1995), pp. 485-503.
6
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V. CONCLUSIONS
Is the selection process for judges for the Oregon Supreme Court and
Court of Appeals in need of major reform? The Committee does not
believe so. It is the responsibility of proponents of Measure 22 to
demonstrate that there is a serious problem that needs to be
addressed and they failed to do so. They did not offer compelling
evidence that the courts have engaged in improper judicial activism
or that they have been biased. The proponents of Measure 22 also
failed to demonstrate that there is widespread and deep
dissatisfaction with the Oregon courts. Furthermore, the committee
heard strong testimony attesting to the high ethical standards of the
judges who sit on the Oregon Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.
The committee acknowledges that a geographic imbalance in the
courts exists. However, it is unclear that this results from, or results in,
any regional bias. Even if the courts ought to be more regionally
diverse, Measure 22 should still be rejected. Its solution to this
problem is too rigid and too drastic, especially when this problem can
be more easily addressed through the governor's power of
appointment.
Most importantly, if the problem Measure 22 seeks to remedy is an
overly politicized judiciary, it is exactly the wrong solution. Turning
justices into representatives can only further politicize the courts.
Judges should not have constituencies, but rather ought to serve on
behalf of the entire state. Judicial impartiality is too valuable to
jeopardize by districting, even if it is done for the sake of the laudable
goal of a more regionally balanced court.
Electing judges by district rather than at-large also increases the
likelihood of political witch-hunts against the judiciary. It would
make it easier for a small highly mobilized and well-funded group to
unseat a judge whose decisions the group found politically distasteful.
Fear of such political reprisals would threaten judicial independence
and stifle dissent on the bench.
The issues raised by the proponents of Measure 22 speak to a
perceived need for more accountability by the judiciary for their
decisions. Members of your committee recognize the need for
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judicial accountability and are sympathetic to the appeal of restoring
the districting of appellate court justices, as originally called for in
Oregon's 1859 Constitution. Ultimately, however, the entire committee
found that the adoption of Measure 22 would be less likely to improve
accountability to voters than it would be to politicize what are not
intended to be political bodies in the usual sense. Judicial
"correctness" lies with the courts correctly and impartially interpreting
the law as it applies to the cases that come before them. The ability of
the courts’ members to act responsibly is less dependent upon how or
in what manner they obtain office, but in their intelligence, training,
and integrity and in the seriousness with which they take their judicial
duties. In the committee's opinion, that seriousness should be
protected from external impediment, be it from an electorate with a
political agenda, political action committees, or special interest groups
attempting to exert undue influence over the members of the courts.
The committee believes that the districting of appellate court judges
would weaken that protection.

VI. RECOMMENDATION
Your Committee unanimously recommends a NO vote on Measure 22.
Respectfully submitted,
Kenneth Dueker
Jack Featheringill
David Mandell
Paul Manson
Steve Olson
Bob Shoemaker, chair
Chuck Stuckey, research advisor
Wade Fickler, research director
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VII. APPENDICES
A. Witness List
Steve Doell, chief petitioner
Angel Lopez, president, Oregon State Bar Association
Joshua Marquis, Clatsop County district attorney
Daniel Meek, attorney
Edwin Peterson, retired chief justice, Oregon Supreme Court
Lynn Rosik, assistant attorney general, assigned to the elections division of
the Office of the Secretary of State
Jacob Tanzer, retired justice, Oregon Supreme Court and Court of Appeals

B. Research Material
1. Certified ballot title for initiative petition #90 (Measure 22), Office of the
Secretary of State, August 9, 2001.
2. Wording of Measure 22, chief petitioner to Office of the Secretary of State,
August 15, 2001.
3. Letter from Douglas F. Zier, assistant attorney general, to John Lindback,
director, Elections Division, re: requested changes in draft ballot title, August
9, 2001.
4. Detailed information re: initiative petition #90, website of the Secretary of
State, www.sos.state.or.us, August 12, 2002.
5. Oregon Constitution, Article V1 1, The Judicial Department, in original form
and as amended by initiative petition, adopted November 8, 19 10. Provided
to the committee by the chief petitioner.
6. Initiative petition to revise Article V1 1 of the Oregon Constitution, July 7,
1910.
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7. Proposed resolution of the Oregon State Bar Association in opposition to
Measure 21, August 19, 2002.
8. Memo from Oregon State Bar Association providing names and cities of
residence of applicants for appointment to the Supreme Court in July and
August, 2001 and Court of Appeals in December, 2000; August 27, 2002.
9. Portland General Electric Company v. Bureau of Labor and Industries,
No. 317 OR 606, 1993. Leading Oregon Supreme Court case on statutory
construction. Referred to committee by witness Edwin Peterson, former chief
justice, Oregon Supreme Court.
10.American Judicature Society, www.ajs.org.
11. Brace, Paul. R. and Melinda Hall. "The Interplay of Preferences, Cases
Facts, Context, and Race in the Politics of Judicial Choice," The Journal of
Politics , Vol. 59, No. 4, November 1997, pp. 1206-1231.
12 Dubois, Philip L. From Ballot to Bench: Judicial Elections and the Quest for
Accountability, University of Texas Press, 1980.
13. Green, Ashbel S. "Courts' Rulings Change Balance of Power," The
Oregonian , November 5, 2001, www.afrd.org/news/news1052001.htm.
14. Hall, Melinda Gann. "Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State
Supreme Courts," The Journal of Politics , Vol. 54, No. 2, May 1992, pp. 427-446.
15. Hall, Melinda Gann. "Justices as Representatives: Elections and Judicial
Politics in the American States," American Politics Quarterly , Vol. 23, No. 4,
October 1995, pp. 485-503.
16. Hibbing, John and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse. Congress as Public Enemy,
Cambridge University Press, 1995.
17. MacDowell, James L. "Constitutional Restraints on State Legislative
Procedure: The Application of Single Subject Rules." State Political and Policy
Conference, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, May 24-25, 2002,
http://garnet.acns.fsu.edu/~tcarsey/McDowell.pdf.
18. Nye, Joseph et al., eds., Why People Don't Trust Government, Harvard
University Press, 1997.

Published in the
City Club of Portland Bulletin
Vol. 84, No. 18
Friday, October 4,2002

Ballot Measure
Resolutions
Ballot Measure 26-34, Parks Levy

Vote “YES” on Measure 26-34
RECOMMENDATION TO SUPPORT BALLOT MEASURE 26-34:
Five-year Levy to Restore Park Services, Repairs, Recreation
Programs

"While there are many things, both small and great, which may
contribute to the beauty of a great city, unquestionably one of the
greatest is a comprehensive system of parks and parkways. "
-- Olmsted Brothers, 1903 Report to the Portland Parks Board
The Portland City Council passed Ordinance No. 176201 referring a
"five-year levy to continue park services, repairs and recreation
programs" to the May 21, 2002 ballot as Ballot Measure 26-28.
Ballot Measure 26-28 received 70% voter support but did not take
effect because the 50% voter turnout requirement to pass levies was
not met.
On July 24, 2002 the City Council passed Resolution No. 36088 which
revised the ballot title to read "restore" rather than "continue" Parks &
Recreation funding and programs but made no substantive changes.
The Council voted to refer the new levy measure to the November
2002 ballot as Ballot Measure 26-34.
The measure will levy $.39 per $1,000 of assessed valuation to
produce an estimated $49.4 million over 5 years, averaging'$9.88
million per year, and costing the average homeowner (based on a
home valued at $150,000) $59.00 per year, or $5.00 per month.
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The levy funds from Ballot Measure 26-34 will be spent on:
. Restoration of basic park maintenance programs including
litter removal, restroom cleaning and mowing;
. Correction of urgent safety problems with playground
equipment, play fields, community centers and pools;
. Repair of some playing fields around schools in the
Centennial, David Douglas, Reynolds, Parkrose and
Portland Public Schools districts;
. Prevention of additional cuts to after school tutoring,
recreation activities, and summer playground programs.
In 1938, 1950, 1978, and 1994, City Club of Portland conducted ballot
measure studies on parks levies. In each case, the Club came out
firmly in support of the ballot measures.
In 1994, the Club also produced a long-term study report entitled
Portland Metropolitan Area Parks . The longer report supported
improving maintenance, effecting deferred repairs, upgrading and
adding facilities, and restoring or expanding programs. Several of the
major recommendations in that report have been realized, in part
because of the funds provided by the 1994 levy.
Since 1997, budget constraints have again led to curtailed programs,
deferred maintenance of property and facilities, diminished safety on
playgrounds and equipment, and closure or curtailment of open hours
at certain facilities.
Common themes in the Club's earlier reports still hold true today:
"Portland's parks are the jewels in the crown of our city and represent
one of the most favorable aspects of life in Portland. Portland,
however, lacks the capacity to meet the parks needs of its existing and
expanding population." (Portland Metropolitan Area Parks , Sept. 1994,
Section VI, Conclusions, p. 137) While this may be less true now, the
pressure of increasing population and park use continue to tax the
system.
Proper physical maintenance of the parks, and of the buildings

City Club Resolution on Ballot

Measure 26-34

and facilities that are contained within, is an ongoing necessity.
However, budget pressures force deferred repairs, curtailed programs,
and decreased staff available to run programs.
The programs conducted in those facilities, by the Portland Bureau of
Parks and Recreation, benefit all citizens; from elders taking a quiet
walk in Laurelhurst Park, to joggers and hikers in Forest Park, to
swimmers and basketball players who use the pools and courts in the
parks and community centers around the city.
In particular, youth- oriented programs run by the Bureau of Parks and
Recreation offer constructive, creative, and healthy outlets for young
minds and bodies, and offer safe, positive activities for their time away
from home and school.
The collaboration between the Bureau of Parks & Recreation and the
area's public schools, which includes collocated facilities and Parks &
Recreation programs run in schools, has been positive and beneficial
to both agencies and to the public they serve.
Although City Club taxation studies have found that the property tax is
undesirably regressive and properties are now inequitably assessed
because of Measure 50 (1997), fundamental tax reform is not being
considered at this time, and no realistic alternative exists to raise
needed revenue for parks services.
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED;

in light of the ongoing needs of the Bureau of Parks and Recreation for
maintenance and improvement of the facilities and programs which
well serve our community, and the need to restore funding and
programs cut since July 1, 2002, and following City Club's support of
past levies to meet those needs, the Board of Governors recommends
that the membership vote “YES” on Ballot Measure 26-34 on the
November 2002 ballot.
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Ballot Measure
Resolutions
Ballot Measure 26-36, Library Levy

Vote “YES” on Measure 26-36
RECOMMENDATION TO SUPPORT BALLOT MEASURE 26-36:
Renew Five-year Local Option Levy for County Library Services
Recognizing the great importance of the Multnomah County Library as
an educational and cultural resource available to all adults and
children of the county, the City Club of Portland has studied and
supported library levies on four occasions (1976, 1984, 1986 [as part of
an extensive study of the library] and 1987). The following resolution
includes a summary of the reports from these studies updated to
current conditions. This resolution is essentially the same as the
resolution passed by the Club in support of Ballot Measure 26-32 that
appeared on the ballot in May 2002. Ballot Measure 26-36 (November
2002) and Ballot Measure 26-32 (May 2002) are identical with the
exception of a revised starting date of July 2003 for the current
measure (as compared to July 2002 for the previous measure).
On May 21, 2002 Measure 26-32 was approved by 59% of voters but
could not take effect because of inadequate voter turnout.
The Board of County Commissioners for Multnomah County on
August 1, 2002 passed Resolution No. 02-109 referring a "five-year local
option levy for library services" to the November 5, 2002 ballot as
Ballot Measure 26-36.
Measure 26-36 seeks to maintain the current level of library service
through 2007.
Ballot Measure 26-36 will levy 75.5 cents per $1000 of assessed value
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to produce an estimated $145.5 million over five years, averaging $29.1
million per year, and costing the average homeowner (based on a
home valued at $150,000) $95.00 per year (an increase of $20 per year),
or $7.93 per month.
The library is critically dependent on levy money--more than 48% of
its budget comes from this source.
The library provides educational and cultural resources to the majority
of county residents--77% of adults and children in Multnomah County
hold library cards.
Library users check out an average of 24 books for every child, woman
and man each year- -the highest rate compared to ten library systems
of similar size in the country.
Library financial support is $64.15 per person, compared to a median
level of per capita support of $62.15 among ten comparable library
systems.
Thirty-four thousand (34,000) children participate in the library's
summer reading program.
The library is the major provider of computer and digital information
resources to roughly half of the county residents who do not own a
computer.
The library is a major provider of information needed for the
formation and maintenance of businesses.
The library is a major provider of information needed for career
planning.
This measure will support the restoration of Monday operating hours
for the library.
The total county library support including this measure will amount to
about four percent (4%) of the total county budget.
Although City Club taxation studies have found that the property tax is
undesirably regressive and properties are now inequitably assessed
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because of Measure 50 (1997), fundamental tax reform is not being
considered at this time, and no realistic alternative exists to raise
needed revenue for library services.
THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED that the Board of Governors

recommends that the membership vote “YES” on Ballot Measure 26-36
on the November 2002 Ballot.

